Thirty years ago, Gordon Tullock posed a provocative puzzle: considering the value of public policies at stake and the reputed in°uence of campaign contributions in policy-making, why is there so little money in U.S. politics? In this paper, we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption.
Introduction
Thirty years ago, Gordon Tullock posed a provocative puzzle. Considering the value of public policies at stake and the reputed in°uence of campaign contributors in policy making, why is there so little money in U.S. politics? Estimates put total campaign spending at about $200 million in 1972, when Tullock¯rst o®ered his critique. Assuming a reasonable rate of return, such an investment could have yielded at most $250-300 million, a sum dwarfed by the hundreds of billions of dollars worth of public expenditures and anti-competitive regulations supposedly at stake (Tullock, 1972 ).
Tullock's observation challenges the basic premises of both economic analyses of cam-paign¯nance and public discourse about reform. Campaign fundraising is widely viewed as a market for public policy. Candidates and parties need money to run e®ective election campaigns. And, donations come from¯rms, associations, and individuals that seek private bene¯ts in the form of subsidies, favorable regulations and other policies set by the government. With thousands of¯rms and other interests bidding for private bene¯ts and thousands of candidates vying for funds, something like a market for legislation emerges. As with any competitive market, the rate of return on the investment in politics should resemble that of other investments. Otherwise,¯rms and individuals will take assets out of other investments and put them in the political market.
The puzzle has not disappeared in the past three decades. Candidates, parties, and organizations raised and spent $3 billion in the 2000 national elections { like 1972, another record. This represents a growth in campaign spending twice the rate of in°ation from 1972 to 2000. However, total federal government spending in 2000 equaled $2 trillion, and consumption and gross investment of the federal government was $590 billion.
The puzzle comes into sharper focus still when we examine speci¯c interests and policies. In a normal market, with such high rates of return, any donor should want to increase their contributions. There are, of course, legal limits on what one can do. However, these constraints are rarely binding. And even the large loopholes that allow donors to skirt the limits { such as \soft" money, independent expenditures, and leadership PACs { account for only a small fraction of the money.
Second, exceptionally high average rates of return, if real, imply that more¯rms and industries should enter the political marketplace. If a relatively small investment of approximately $200,000 brings a return of $1 billion, or even one-thousandth that amount, then any investor should want to shift assets out of other investments and enter the political market.
A surpringly large number of¯rms { even¯rms in the Fortune 500 { do not participate at all, even though there are virtually no barriers to entry.
The existing theoretical work in economics and political science cannot account for these facts. One body of research posits that campaign¯nance re°ects a competitive market for private bene¯ts from public laws or for services and e®ort from politicians. 3 Such a market might exist, but the small amounts given imply that it must be small. As we discuss below, it likely cannot explain most of the money given, let alone most of the value of policy reputedly for sale.
A second strain in the theoretical literature posits that there is a market failure in politics that gives legislators more of the bargaining power. 4 In particular, legislators hold key \gate keeping" positions, and can threaten regulation or harassing oversight unless interest groups contribute. Such extortionary practices seem unlikely given the trivial amounts of money raised.
A third strain of theorizing argues that donors are monopoly providers of campaign funds and that legislators compete for contributions (Dal-Bo, 2001; Helpman and Persson, 2001) .
The prediction of such models is that donors get a lot for a little, which is one possible answer to Tullock's puzzle. However, the lack of entry presents a severe problem for these models. If there are average rates of return in the many thousands, then we would expect rms, individuals, and associations to°ock to campaign¯nance. But, most¯rms and people do not give, even though entry is essentially costless.
Why are interest groups' campaign contributions so small? Why aren't more¯rms and industries involved?
We favor an alternative explanation: Campaign contributing is a form of consumption, or, in the language of politics, participation. As we show below, almost all money in the existing campaign¯nance system comes ultimately from individuals and in relatively small sums. Individuals give because they are ideologically motivated, because they are excited by the politics of particular elections, because they are asked by their friends or colleagues, and because they have the resources necessary to engage in this particular form of participation, namely money. By far the single strongest predictor of contributing is income. The people who give to politics are also disproportionately likely to participate in other ways, including attending meetings, writing letters, talking to others, and voting (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) . We call these donors \consumer contributors."
They account for most of the campaign money in politics.
Individuals not only give the average dollar to campaigns, they also give the marginal dollar. Candidates in competitive races raise and spend more than those in lopsided races, and most of the additional money comes from individual contributors and parties. Senate candidates in large states raise and spend many times more money as those in small states, and almost all of the additional money comes from individuals. Consistent with the notion that campaign spending re°ects participation, trends in aggregate spending over the last 100 years are explained entirely by growth in personal income.
It is true that corporations, labor unions and other interest groups give nontrivial amounts of money to politics. They raise money from individuals and contribute those funds through the groups' political action committees to candidates and parties. They also give \soft" money to parties, skirting federal contribution limits. When economic interest groups give, they usually appear to act as rational investors. 5 However, this \investor" money accounts for only a small fraction of overall campaign funds.
Corporations and other investor contributors may still have substantial in°uence on policy. Evidence for this idea, however, is thin. We have surveyed an extensive literature and conducted our own analyses of legislative decision making. Legislators' votes depend almost entirely on their own beliefs and the preferences of their voters and their party. Contributions explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the U.S. Congress.
Investor contributors have little leverage because politicians can raise su±cient funds from consumer contributors. Members of Congress care foremost about winning reelection.
They must attend to the constituency that elects them, voters in a district or state, and the constituency that nominates them, the party. Legislators can run e®ective campaigns by appealing to individuals for funds. Interest groups can get only a little from their contributions, so they give only a little.
In sections 2-4 below we document that the levels and trends in campaign funds do not follow basic predictions of rent-seeking models. Instead, campaign¯nance looks more like consumption or participation. Section 2 of the paper presents a portrait of where campaign funds come from in U.S. politics today. Section 3 examines what drives the level and°uctuations in campaign spending. Section 4 considers what explains legislation. The¯nal section o®ers tentative answers to the puzzle we pose: Why give at all?
Sources and Sums
Stepping back from the theories, it is useful to observe who gives what and how. Individuals, groups, and parties may also run their own advocacy or independent campaigns on behalf of or against individual candidates. Individuals, groups, party committees and candidates must report all contributions, receipts, and expenditures to the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). 7 FECA constrains how money can be raised and how much can be given. Sorauf (1988, Chapter 2) provides an excellent overview. Brie°y, the rules are as follows.
First, to ensure transparency in accounting, organizations wishing to contribute to federal candidates and parties must create \separate and segregated funds," commonly known as political action committees (PACs). Organizations may not give money directly to their PACs, except to cover start-up, administrative, and fund-raising expenses. All money that is contributed to candidates or parties (or spent on independent political advertising) must be raised by voluntary donations from individuals. Corporate PACs raise almost all of their money from their managers, and unions, trade associations, and professional associations raise almost all of their money from their members. Thus, individuals are the ultimate 6 Parties and candidates may give to each other, but such transfers account for a trivial percent of total funds. 7 Sorauf (1992) provides an excellent summary of the FECA system. source of all PAC contributions.
Second, individuals, PACs, and party committees can give only limited amounts directly to federal candidates and committees. The lowest limits are on individuals, not groups.
PACs may give $10,000 in a two-year election cycle to a candidate ($5,000 each calendar year). Party committees may give no more than $17,500 to a candidate in a two-year election cycle. Individuals may give no more than $2,000 to a candidate in an election cycle ($1,000
each calendar year), no more than $5,000 to a PAC in a calendar year, and no more than $20,000 to a party committee in a calendar year. An individual may give no more than $25,000 total in a calendar year. 8
Third, presidential candidates may receive public funds if they agree to abide by spending limits. General election candidates may receive complete federal funding; primary election candidates may receive public funds to match privately raised contributions. FECA set the general election spending limit at $20 million in 1976, and this limit increases with the consumer price index. accounts, so-called \soft" money. Individuals and groups may give unlimited amounts to non-federal party funds for the purpose of party building activities. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) created soft party money through a set of administrative rulings in 1978 and 1979. Such funds, it was hoped, would strengthen party organizations in the individual states. In fact, soft money has just become an accounting convention used by the national party organizations to raise even more money. Although unlimited in amount, independent expenditures and soft party donations must still be publicly disclosed. The 2002 amendments to the FECA restricted soft money. 9
Even with these substantial loopholes, almost all campaign money comes in the form of \hard" contributions that must abide by the limits, and all of these funds come ultimately from individuals. A simple accounting for the 2000 elections reveals this immediately.
Candidate and party committees raised nearly $3 billion during the 1999-2000 election cycle. Congressional candidates raised and spent just over $1 billion in the 2000 election;
presidential candidates raised and spent just over $500 million; and political party hard and soft money accounts totaled $1.2 billion. PACs raised $600 million, approximately $320 million of which was for fundraising and other expenses and $20 million of which was devoted to independent expenditures; the remainder was contributed to congressional candidates. 10
The majority of this money came from individuals in small amounts. We estimate that of the $3 billion, individuals contributed nearly $2.4 billion, the public treasury paid $235 million, and about $380 million came directly from the treasuries of corporations, unions, and other associations. 11 And campaign money comes mainly in dribs and drabs. According to survey research, in the 2000 election approximately 10 percent of the Americans over 18 (21 million people) gave to political candidates, party committees, or political organizations. 9 A further loophole allows legislators to set up leadership PACs which allow donors to give up to $10,000 to a candidate, but such funds cannot be used on that candidate's campaigns. 10 The party accounts are the most di±cult to analyze. Transfers between party accounts amount to approximately 10 percent of all party money. The correct¯gure is probably, then, about $1 billion.
11 The FEC does not provide a direct accounting of this¯gure because only the total amount of contributions under $200 must be reported, not the speci¯c donations. We estimated the total amount of soft money from¯rms and organizations (approximately $380 million) using the individual donor¯les and on-line reports from the Federal Election Commission: www.fec.gov.
The average contribution from an individual to a candidate, party committee or PAC, then, is approximately $115. 12
Of the estimated $2.4 billion in individuals' contributions, about $1.1 billion takes the form of direct contributions to congressional and presidential candidates; $700 million goes to the parties; and $600 million goes to PACs. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the PAC world is the fact that the constraints on contributions are not binding. Only 4 percent of all PAC contributions to House and Senate candidates are at or near the $10,000 limit. The average PAC contribution is $1,700. Corporations give an average contribution of approximately $1,400 to legislators; trade associations and membership groups give average contributions of approximately $1,700, and labor unions give average contributions of $2,200. Viewed from the perspective of rent-seeking legislature, these sums are quite small. If such models capture the essence of campaign fundraising, then legislators should extract much larger contributions from interested donors. If donors reached the maximum allowed amount, PACs would have given six times as much as they do, or nearly $2 billion.
Much
Comparing the di®erent sorts of contributions, it is evident that individuals are by far the most important source of campaign funds. Even in congressional elections, where PACs are most active, candidates raised over 3 times more from individuals directly than they did from PACs.
What Drives Campaign Spending?
Individual contributions are the core of the campaign¯nance system. We therefore expect that the factors that determine why individuals give are the factors that drive total campaign spending.
The tiny size of the average contribution made by private citizens suggests that little private bene¯t could be bought with such donations. Instead, political giving must be a form of consumption not unlike giving to charities, such as the United Way or public radio.
Economic theory predicts relatively little about such consumption goods, except that like any normal good they will grow with income. Survey researchers in political science and sociology have documented exactly this pattern. Income is the main predictor of giving to political campaigns and organizations, and it is the main predictor of contributing to nonreligious charities. And, individuals give very little to politics, much less than to charities.
Political contributions in 2000 were just 4 hundredths of one percent of national income.
The contribution behavior of top corporate executives proves the rule. We examined the political contributions of 94 top executives from 12 large corporations { some of the wealthiest people in America. 13 On average, these executives gave $3,000 to their own corporations' political action committees in the 1997-1998 election cycle. They gave an additional $4,500 to candidates, parties, and other committees, for an average total political contribution of $7,500 per executive, far below the $25,000 allowed under FECA. Dividing by their annual compensation, these executives gave $51 for every $100,000 of income each year. In other words, top corporate executives gave about 5 hundredths of one percent of their annual compensation to political campaigns, only slightly above the national average. 14 As with the public at large, giving to charity is much more important to¯rms and executives than giving to politics. Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) studied 15 large corporations in 1998. The¯rms in their sample gave $1,611 million to charities and just $16 million to political campaigns. 15
The notion that campaign contributions mainly re°ect consumption and participation of many individuals suggests that personal income should determine the amount raised and spent in campaigns.
Alternatively, a basic prediction of rent-seeking models is that total government spending should explain total campaign spending. The growth of government over the last 60 years, the argument goes, has meant that government regulations, taxes and subsidies, and other policies, can have substantial e®ects on private interests. The very threat of regulation or other unfavorable treatment may induce private interests to give to politics. As a result, the more government spends, the more private interests must contribute (Lott 2000) . This should hold even if donors are able to buy a lot for a little. All three data sets point to one conclusion. Campaign spending tracks with income and electoral competition (that is, demand for money), and not with government spending.
Trend 1: Spending Under FECA.
Over the past two decades, the Federal Elections Campaign Act has been widely criticized because the system of contribution limits and disclosure requirements has not contained the growth of campaign spending. On the political left, the criticism is that growing expenditures re°ect widespread vote buying. On the political right, the criticism is that growing expenditures re°ect government extraction of \political" rent from private interests.
The¯rst piece of evidence in these critiques is the growth of real campaign spending over the last 20 years. Figure 1A From our perspective, however, price in°ation is not the right baseline against which to measure campaign spending growth. A more appropriate baseline is national income, shown in Figure 1B .
Interestingly, there is no trend in campaign spending relative to national income over the period 1976-2000 (to the right of the vertical line). Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2001) examine trends in individual, PAC, and party contributions. After de°ating each type of money by GDP, no trends are evident within each category of campaign money. Unfortunately, it is impossible to distinguish the e®ects of income growth and government spending growth on presidential campaign spending in these series. The correlation between real per-capita GDP and real per-capita federal spending is .98, and even the long historical series contains just 23 observations. 19 The spending and population¯gures are in logarithms, so the coe±cients are elasticities. The regression includes¯xed e®ects for each state to correct for di®erences in state campaign laws and other unmeasured state e®ects.
[ Table 1] Personal income and electoral competition strongly predict spending. The coe±cient on log of per-capita income is approximately equal to 1, consistent with the¯ndings above that the share of income spent on campaigns is constant. Government spending, on the other hand, has no independent e®ect on total campaign spending. 20 18 The data on campaign contributions, campaign expenditures, and election results are from the Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures Database compiled by Thad Beyle and Jennifer M. Jensen, and America Votes (various years). To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive data set that exists on aggregate gubernatorial campaign spending. Personal income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/data.htm, and state government expenditure data is from the U.S. Census Bureau, Compendium of State Government Finances. 19 The three electoral competition measures de¯ned as follows: Closeness in General Election = 1¡v G , where v G is the winning candidate's vote share in the general election. Average Closeness in 1st Primary is the average of 1¡v D and 1¡v R , where v D is the winning candidate's vote share in the¯rst Democratic primary election and v R is the winning candidate's vote share in the¯rst Republican primary election. Average Closeness in 2nd Primary is de¯ned analogously. The winning candidate's vote share is 1 in uncontested races. 20 The average within state correlation between income and government spending is .86. Table 1 , one can calculate that per-capita income growth and population growth explain nearly all of the growth in per-capita campaign spending in the states. Both per-capita income and population grew from the 1970s to the 1990s. The e®ect of income growth on predicted levels of campaign spending is roughly 4 times larger than the e®ect of population growth.
Using the coe±cients in
Electoral competition has a strong positive e®ect on total spending. However, these variables trend downward over the period studied. Gubernatorial elections were, on average, more competitive in the 1970s than in the 1990s, and fewer seats came open during the 1990s. Thus, the trend in electoral competition cannot explain the growth in spending.
Rather, these variables would predict a trend in the opposition direction.
Cross-Sectional Analysis.
Looking across elections teaches a similar lesson. 
What Explains Legislative Decisions?
The critical evidence for the argument that campaign¯nance re°ects a market for policy is whether contributions have substantial e®ects on legislative decisions and policy outcomes.
Almost all research on donors' in°uence in legislative politics the e®ects of contributions on roll call votes cast by members of Congress. 23
Dozens of studies have considered the e®ects of contributions on legislative votes, across hundreds of pieces of legislation. We surveyed nearly fourty articles in economics and political science that examine the relationship between PAC contributions and congressional voting behavior. Others study narrower issues and include more narrowly de¯ned contribution measures { e.g., regressing votes on dairy price supports on contributions from dairy industry PACs.
[ Table 2 here]
Setting aside questions about the right speci¯cation, what do these studies suggest?
We count the number of coe±cients on PAC contributions that are signed correctly and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level (two-tailed). 24 PAC contributions show relatively few e®ects. In three out of four instances, campaign contributions had no statistically signi¯cant e®ects on legislation or had the wrong sign (suggesting that more contributions lead to less support). Also, given the di±culty of publishing \non-results" in academic journals, we suspect that the true incidence of papers written showing campaign contributions in°uence votes is even smaller.
23 Exceptions are Hall and Wayman (1990) , who study e®ort on behalf of groups, and Langbein (1986) , who study minutes spent with lobbyists. Hansen and Park (1995) study policy outputs { antidumping and countervailing duty decisions by the International Trade Administration { and¯nd that total PAC contributions by an industry typically have no e®ect on the industry's chances of obtaining a favorable decision.
24 Many papers run a similar model many times, adding di®erent variables to the model to check robustness. We count these as one regression equation. If the coe±cients of interest in these nested models are signed correctly and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level of signi¯cance for a two-tailed test in at least half the models, we count this as¯nding campaign contributions as statistically signi¯cant. We also consider the speci¯cation as \one regression" if there are only small changes to the speci¯cation, such as a di®erent measure of a control variable, such as ideology.
We are interested not only in statistical signi¯cance, but also in magnitudes. Unfortunately, it is di±cult to interpret the relative magnitude and meaning of the coe±cients for most of the analyses in Table 2 , because few of these papers report enough information about the data (e.g., means and standard deviations of the underlying variables). In addition, two well-known speci¯cation issues plague most of these studies. First, there is likely simultaneity between contributions and votes { in many studies the level of PAC contributions is the dependent variable and a roll-call-based measure of \ideology" is one of the independent variables. This issue is ignored in most studies (see Table 2 ). Second, although most papers attempt to control for district interests and members' own preferences, the variables used are typically crude because of limits on the available data. This is a serious problem because of the tendency for groups to contribute to \friendly" legislators. Such a strategy is well-grounded theoretically { groups may contribute in part to help re-elect their friends, and legislators from \friendly" districts may be able provide services to the groups at lower marginal cost { and is well documented empirically. 25
To address these problems, we perform our own statistical analysis. Our dependent variable is the roll call voting score produced by the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
(CCUS). We collected this for the U.S. House from 1978 to 1994. Like many interest groups, the CCUS identi¯es 12-20 bills in each Congress that are important to its interests, and calculates the percentage of times that each member of Congress votes with the group.
Scores therefore run from 0 to 100. 26 We estimate six models, which cover much of the range found in the existing literature.
First, we consider three di®erent ways of controlling for district and legislator preferences:
including party a±liation of the member and a measure of district preferences based on voting patterns; including party a±liation of the member and a district-speci¯c¯xed e®ect;
and including a legislator-speci¯c¯xed e®ect. The last two speci¯cations exploit the panel structure of the data { we observe most legislators several times in the sample. We believe that using legislator-speci¯c¯xed e®ects provides the most compelling estimates, because this controls for legislators' own (average) preferences in addition to district preferences.
There is strong evidence that legislators are not tightly constrained by their constituencies when casting roll call votes. 27
In addition, we estimate each speci¯cation using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV). We follow Chappell (1981 Chappell ( , 1982 , Welch (1982) , and others in choosing instruments. Two types of variables are used: the degree of electoral competition, and measures of members' relative \power" inside the House. The idea is that a close race increases an incumbent's demand for PAC contributions, producing an exogenous shift in contributions via in increase in the propensity to \sell" services, including roll call votes.
Groups give more to powerful members because their support is especially valuable. 28
The results are shown in Table 3 . The¯rst three columns of present the OLS estimates and the second three columns present the IV estimates. Overall, our¯ndings parallel that of the broader literature. Indicators of party, ideology, and district preferences account for most of the systematic variation in legislators' roll call voting behavior. Interest group contributions account for at most a small amount of the variation. In fact, after controlling adequately for legislator ideology, these contributions have no detectable e®ects on legislative behavior.
Why Do Interest Groups Give at All?
Aggregate campaign spending in the United States, we conjecture, mainly re°ects the consumption value that individuals receive from giving to campaigns. Perhaps the sharpest evidence in support of this conjecture is the¯nding that income, not government spending, explains campaign spending in the states. In addition, individual contributors provide the average and the marginal dollar to political campaigns. Because politicians can readily raise campaign funds from individuals, rent-seeking donors lack the leverage to extract excessively large private bene¯ts from legislation. This argument suggest a reorientation of future research on campaign¯nance. First, it is still possible that campaign contributions have signi¯cant e®ects on economic and social policies. To raise su±cient funds, candidates might skew policies in ways preferred by donors. Campaign contributions might therefore act like weighted votes. And contributors, who are disproportionately wealthy, might have di®erent policy preferences than the median voter. Whether this has signi¯cant e®ects on policy is unknown. Fleshing this out requires careful study of how policy responds to the preferences of contributors and the overall level of contributions.
Second, more empirical and theoretical work remains to make the argument convincing.
As with other forms of voluntary public-spirited activities such as giving to charities or voting, the theoretical underpinnings of small campaign donations are not well developed.
It is unclear what speci¯c empirical predictions distinguish consumption from rent-seeking, or what evidence will prove compelling.
The consumption idea itself needs re¯nement. Consumption might take many forms, including expression, citizen duty, and social life. Do fundraising strategies of PACs look like those of charitable organizations or like those of venture capitalists? Charities hold events, bring in speakers with as much celebrity status as possible, and conduct mass-mail drives. If campaign contributions are a form of expression, then we might expect certain types of people go give to like types of candidates and organizations, e.g., women to women candidates. Are contributors more interested in politics on a personal level than other citizens? Is politics an important part of their social life?
Finally, if the consumption/participation/expression argument is correct, then it turns Tullock's puzzle on its head. The question is not why do corporations, unions, and other interest groups give so little, but why do they give at all? Why do they form PACs? 29 Why do they behave so strategically when they give?
We think there are four possible answers, each deserving of further exploration.
One possible answer is that interest groups give a little and get a little. Although aggregate expenditures primarily re°ect consumption, a subset of donors { mainly corporate and industry PACs { behave as if they expected favors in return. These contributors may in fact receive a reasonable rate of return, say 20 percent, but their investments do not account for most money, and they do not explain much government activity.
A second answer is that money buys access, rather than policy directly. Legislators and their sta®ers are busy people. Campaign contributions are one way to improve the chances of getting to see the legislator about matters of concern to the group. There is some evidence that campaign contributions are tied to lobbying activities. Groups that give large amounts to political campaigns emphasize lobbying. 30 The behavior of interest groups speaks to the value of lobbying: organizations spend 10 times more on lobbying than they do on campaign contributions. 31 Of course, access itself does not guarantee in°uence, but only the opportunity to provide information that might in°uence legislators.
A third explanation is that groups seek to a®ect elections { to elect legislators that are sympathetic to their views and defeat legislators known to be hostile. Our analysis of roll call voting above reveals that who is in the legislature { a Republican or a Democrat { has an enormous e®ect on support for a range of policies of importance to groups. Helping to elect friends might have much larger marginal e®ects on legislation than trying to buy support from those already in Congress. Why doesn't this lead groups to contribute untold billions of dollars to friendly candidates? There are two reasons. First, statistical analyses estimate that the marginal e®ect of an additional $100,000 of campaign spending is quite small, probably no more than 1 percentage point in the vote in the typical House race even in the observed ranges (e.g., Jacobson, 1980; Levitt, 1994) . Second, collective action problems abound, leading to under-investment in activities that may bene¯t, say business as a whole.
A¯nal possibility is that even interest groups give for consumption. PAC contributions are solicited at events attended by prominent national politicians { people of celebrity status. Organizations' executives and managers may value being part of the Washington establishment.
30 Sabato (1984) discusses the general connection between contributions and lobbying. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (2002) ¯nd a strong correlation between between the amount groups contribute and the amount they lobby. Langbein (1986) estimates the price of a legislator's time. The estimate { that one hour of time costs around $10,000 { does not appear unreasonable. 31 The Lobby Reform Act (1995) provides for disclosure of expenditures on executive and legislative lobbying. In 1997-1998, interest groups spent $3 billion on lobbying, compared to $300 million on PAC contributions (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (2002) . Chappell (1981) cargo preference 1 yes 4/8 yes Kau, Rubin (1981) various economic 8 yes 9/48 yes Kau, Kennan, Rubin (1982) various economic 8 yes 5/26 yes Chappell (1982) variety 7 yes 0/8 yes Welch (1982) dairy subsidy 1 yes 2/4 yes Evans (1986) tax, Chrysler 8 no ?/16 1 yes Kau, Rubin (1984) variety 10 yes 10/30 n/r Peltzman (1984) variety 333 no 5/12 yes Feldstein, Melnick (1984) health care 1 no 1/1 yes Coughlin (1985) domestic content 2 no 2/2 yes Johnson (1985) bank, real estate 9 yes 11/45 yes Wright (1985) variety 5 no ?/5 2 yes Wayman (1985a) arms control 11 no 0/1 yes Wayman (1985b) arms control 8 no 1/12 n/i Frendreis, Waterman (1985) trucking 4 no 2/2 yes Schroedel (1986) banking 3 no 3/5 yes Wilhite, Theilmann (1987) labor 2 yes 2/2 yes Tosini, Tower (1987) trade (textiles) 1 no 1/2 yes Jones, Keiser (1987) labor 1 no 5/5 yes Saltzman (1987) labor 1 yes 2/2 yes MacArthur, Marks (1988) domestic content 1 no 1/1 yes Grenzke (1989) variety 30 yes 6/100 yes Vesenka (1989) agriculture 14 no 4/14 yes Neustadl (1990) labor, business 2 no 4/8 yes Wright (1990) tax, agriculture 2 no 0/4 no Langbein, Lotwis (1990) gun control 6 no 2/3 yes Durden et al. (1991) strip mining 3 no 2/2 yes Mayer (1991) aircraft carriers 1 no 0/1 yes Stratmann (1991) agriculture 10 yes 8/10 yes Rothenberg (1992) MX missile 8 no 1/8 yes Langbein (1993) gun control 6 no 0/5 yes Marks (1993) trade 5 no 2/5 yes Nollen, Quinn (1994) trade 6 no 3/18 yes Stratmann (1995) agriculture 10 yes 13/20 yes Bronars, Lott (1997) variety 35 no 5/50 yes Stratmann (2002) banking 2 no 6/6 yes n/r = not reported; n/i = not included # Sig PAC Coe®s column: The¯rst number gives the number of coe±cients on PAC contribution variables that are statistically signi¯cant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) and have the predicted sign. The second number gives the total number of PAC contribution variables in the analysis. 1 Reports that \PAC contributions were usually among the less important in°uences on House members' voting on the two bills" (p. 126). 2 Reports that \In none of the¯ve cases examined were campaign contributions an important enough force to change the legislative outcomes from what they would have been without any contributions" (p. 411). 
